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Abstract
This paper presents evidence which challenges the view that techniques which are
designed to measure the social preferences of subjects can always be accomplished in a
nonintrusive manner. We nd evidence that such measurements can inuence the prefer-
ences which they are designed to measure. Researchers often measure social preferences by
posing a series of dictator game allocation decisions; we use a particular technique, Social
Value Orientation (SVO). In our experiment we vary the order of the SVO measurement
and a lager stakes dictator game. We nd that subjects with prosocial preferences act
even more prosocially when the SVO measurement is administered rst, whereas those
with selsh preferences are una¤ected by the order of the measurement. Additionally, we
nd evidence that this di¤erence is driven by the presence of choices involving the size of
surplus.
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1 Introduction
Ideally, an experimenter measures the preferences of a subject in order to make predictions
regarding behavior. It is commonly thought that such a measurement could be done in a
nonintrusive manner: that the measurement does not a¤ect the preferences which they are
designed to measure and hence behavior would be identical whether or not the measurement
was made. In this paper, we present evidence which challenges this view.
It is known that many subjects do not simply maximize their own material payo¤s.1
Specically, it is often observed that some subjects will sacrice their own material payo¤s
so that other subjects will receive a better material outcome. Researchers often attempt to
infer the nature of these social preferences by posing a series of allocation decisions, often
referred to as dictator games. These decisions entail a choice of an allocation of hypothetical
or small material outcomes distributed between the subject and another subject. A specic
measurement technique, which we use here, is Social Value Orientation (SVO).
If SVO does not a¤ect preferences then the order of the measurement should not matter to
our results. If, however, SVO does a¤ect preferences then the order will matter to our results.
In our experiment we vary the order of the measurement of SVO and a standard, lager stakes
dictator game.2 While we nd that the measure of SVO is signicantly related to behavior
in the dictator game, we also nd that the mapping between the measurement of SVO and
behavior in the dictator game is related to the timing of the measurement. Specically, we nd
that the subjects, for whom SVO indicates prosocial preferences, act even more prosocially
when the SVO measurement is administered rst. By contrast, we nd that the subjects for
whom the SVO suggests selsh preferences are una¤ected by the order of the measurement.
These results suggest that measuring social preferences, through techniques such as SVO,
might a¤ect the preferences which they are designed to measure.
To help identify possible causes of the result above, we also run the identical experiment
with the exception that the dictator game is such that the relative price of each allocation
is 1 to 3 rather than the standard 1 to 1. In other words, each $0.50 kept by the subject
reduces the recipients payo¤s by $1.50. In this case, we nd no signicant di¤erence between
1For an early example, see Deutsch (1958).
2For more on dictator games, see Forsythe et. al. (1994), Ho¤man et. al. (1994), Eckel and Grossman
(1996), Ru­ e (1998) and Bolton et. al. (1998).
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the prosocials who have SVO measured before the dictator game and the prosocials who have
SVO measured after the dictator game. This suggests that decisions involving the creation
of surplus in the measurement of SVO are important to the endogenous nature of the social
preferences of the prosocials.
1.1 Social Value Orientation as a Measure of Social Preferences
We measure social preferences through SVO because the measure is relatively easy to admin-
ister and interpret. The technique (adapted from Van Lange et. al. 1997) consists of 9
items with three possible choices involving material payo¤s accruing to the subject and an-
other subject.3 Each of the nine items has an individualistic response, a prosocial response
and a competitive response. The individualistic response is the one in which the material
payo¤s accruing to oneself are the largest. In other words, selecting the individualistic choice
suggests that the subject neither positively nor negatively values material payo¤s accruing to
the other subject. The prosocial response is the one in which the sum of the material payo¤s
accruing to both the subject and the other subject are the largest. In other words, selecting
the prosocial response suggests that the subject positively values material payo¤s accruing to
the other subject. The competitive response is the one in which the di¤erence between the
material payo¤s accruing to the subject and the other subject are the largest. In other words,
selecting the competitive choice suggests that the subject negatively values material payo¤s
accruing to the other subject.
Translated into a utility function, SVO measures the form of:
u(xown; xother) = f(xown) + g(xother)
where xown is the material payo¤ accruing to self, xother is the material payo¤ accruing to
another person and f and g are increasing functions. A prosocial choice indicates that  > 0,
an individualistic choice suggests that  = 0 and a competitive choice suggests that  < 0.
Further, there is much written on the stability of SVO. For instance, Bogaert et. al. (2008)
suggest that over the 40 years since its introduction by Messick and McClintock (1968), it has
been widely regarded as providing a stable measure of a personality trait. However, recent
3See the appendix for a complete description of the SVO items.
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work has suggested instances where SVO can be a¤ected by the setting and is thereby a less
than perfectly stable measure.4 Iedema and Poppe (1994) show that the measurement of
SVO can be a¤ected by self-presentation e¤ects. Smeesters et. al. (2003) show that priming
certain types of behavior can lead to a di¤erent mapping from SVO to behavior. While
SVO is considered relatively stable, to our knowledge there is no work suggesting that the
measurement of SVO can a¤ect the preferences which they are designed to measure.
It is obviously problematic that taking a measurement might a¤ect the quantity it is
designed to gauge because a measure is primarily useful to the extent that it can form a basis
of making predictions about behavior. This is certainly the case with SVO as it has been
used to study behavior in games (Parks, 1994; Kramer et. al., 1986; Pruyn and Riezehos,
2001), the decision to use public transportation (Van Vugt et. al., 1996), proenvironmental
behavior (Cameron et. al., 1998; Joireman et. al., 2001) and volunteerism (McClintock and
Allison, 1989)
SVO also appears in the economics literature.5 However each of these papers uses the
ring measure, which is slightly di¤erent than the technique which we use. The ring measure
consists of 24 pair-wise items rather than 9 items with 3 choices. However, similar to the
technique which we employ, the ultimate objective is to classify subjects as one of a few types.
Relatively little is known about the relationship between the ring measure and the measure
which we employ (Bogaert et. al., 2008). However, we opt for the latter as it requires fewer
responses and is more transparent. As a result of these characteristics, we conjecture that
the e¤ects which we nd here would only be strengthened by using the ring measure.
Finally, measuring social preferences via dictator games, like SVO, has the advantage that
it only considers a situation where strategic issues are absent. Although all decisions would
be made in the absence of the feedback of the actions of other dictators, it still remains
possible that the subject would anticipate some reciprocal arrangement. Therefore, similar
to Carpenter (2005), we employ a triadic design whereby each dictator decides an allocation
involving self and another dictator. However, this other dictator does not decide on an
allocation involving the original dictator but rather on a third dictator.
4Also see Au and Kwong (2004) and Hertel and Fiedler (1994,1998).
5See Buckley et. al. (2001), Buckley et. al. (2003), Burlando and Guala (2005), Carpenter (2003),
Carpenter (2005), Cornelissen et. al. (2007), Kanagaretnam et. al. (2009), O¤erman et. al. (1996) and
Sonnemans et. al. (2006).
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1.2 Other Measures of Social Preferences
Another commonly used social preference measurement technique is GARP as developed by
Andreoni and Miller (2002). SVO is similar to GARP in that both techniques pose a series
of dictator games however there remain important di¤erences. In GARP, choice is much
less restricted than in SVO. Each SVO item has only three possible responses, whereas each
GARP item seeks an allocation of tokens ranging from 40 to 100. As a result, GARP yields
less coarse data than SVO. However, the choice in GARP is less transparent than SVO, as
the latter explicitly lists the material allocation of each choice. We are not aware of a study
which compares the relative merits of the two measures.
Charness and Rabin (2002) pose a series of simple games to learn the specic form of social
preferences6 related to relative wealth and reciprocity. The nature of the social preferences
might depend on whether others payo¤s are higher than or lower than the subjects own
payo¤s therefore Charness and Rabin vary this aspect of their items. By contrast, in SVO
the subject decides among choices where monetary payo¤s accruing to self are never less than
that accruing to the other subject. Also, in contrast the technique employed in Charness and
Rabin, SVO is not equipped to evaluate preferences for reciprocity.
1.3 Endogenous Social Preferences and Behavioral Spillovers
Our paper is related to the study of endogenous social preferences. For instance, Carpenter
(2005) and Canegallo et. al. (2008) investigate how the environment can a¤ect preferences.7
By contrast, we study whether a subjects own response to a measurement instrument can
a¤ect subsequent behavior. In this sense, we are closely related to Guth et. al. (2008). These
authors nd that subjects who contribute more in a public goods game are signicantly more
trusting in a subsequent investment game.
There also exists a strand of literature which examines the role of the environment on
play in games. For instance, Bednar et. al. (2009) describe an experiment in which subjects
simultaneously play two distinct games with di¤erent opponents. The authors nd that
6Chen and Li (2009) perform a similar type of analysis when considering the type, or identity, of the other
subject.
7Schotter et. al. (1996) examines the e¤ect of framing on judgements of fairness and is therefore related to
endogenous preferences. Eckel and Grossman (2005) nd that a strong identity manipulation can induce more
cooperation in public goods game. Also, see Bowles (1998) for more on endogenous preferences.
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behavior in a particular game is a¤ected by corresponding paired game.8 This literature
contends that strategies which are used in one game are often applied to the other, despite
that the games should be played independently.
Although the line between the endogenous social preferences literature and the behavioral
spillovers literature can be imprecise, we describe our paper as the former because SVO is
explicitly designed to measure social preferences.
2 Study 1
2.1 Overview
We seek to better understand the e¤ects which dictator-type measurements of social prefer-
ences can have on subjects. If these measures do not a¤ect preferences then the order of the
measurement should not matter to the results. If, however, the measures do a¤ect preferences
then the order will matter to the results.
2.2 Procedure
A total of 96 students from Rutgers University-Camden participated in Study 1. The subjects
were given course credit for attendance and were told that that a randomly selected 25% from
each session would be paid the amount earned from the experiment. The subjects completed
a measure of SVO and decided on an allocation in a standard $10 dictator game.
The subjects were aware of the triadic design as they were told to make allocation decisions
involving themselves ("You") and another subject ("Other1"). Another subject ("Other2")
was to make allocations involving Other2 and You. Therefore, the amount accruing to each
subject was what was kept in the You-Other1 allocation decisions plus what Other2 did not
keep in the Other2-You allocation decisions. In both the measurement of SVO and the choice
in the dictator game, the status of You, Other1 and Other2 would remain xed.
The measurement of SVO entailed the nine items from Van Lange et. al. (1997). For the
measurement of SVO, the amount the subject could earn ranged from $0.94 to $1.06. Also
the subject could send an amount which ranged from $0.19 to $0.94. The subjects were not
told these amounts, however they could be calculated with relative ease. The dictator game
8Also see Bednar and Page (2007), Crawford and Broseta (1998) and Van Hyuck et. al. (1993).
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was presented to the subjects in $0.25 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate
which of the 41 dictator game allocations they most preferred.
In each trial, approximately half of the subjects answered the SVO items then made a
choice in the dictator game. We refer to this treatment as SVO First. Approximately half
responded to the dictator game then answered the SVO items. We refer to this treatment as
SVO Last.
2.3 Results
Using the procedure of Van Lange et. al. (1997), we categorized 32 subjects (33%) as prosocial,
39 subjects (41%) as individualists and 5 subjects (5%) as competitors. There were 20 subjects
(21%) who we could not classify as they did not select a minimum of 6 choices of a particular
type. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of subjects according to SVO categorization and
timing of measurement.
Prosocial Individualistic Competitive Uncategorized Total
SVO First 14 24 3 8 49
SVO Last 18 15 2 12 47
Total 32 39 5 20 96
Table 1: Number of subjects by SVO categorization and measurement timing
The measure of SVO was found to provide a signicant predictor of behavior across both
treatments. See Table 2 for the amount kept in the dictator game by SVO classication.
Prosocial Unclassied Proself
Average Amount Kept in Dictator Game $4:68 $5:75 $7:28
(2:574) (10:204) (6:173)
Table 2: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication with variance in
parentheses
The prosocial subjects kept signicantly less than did the proself (individualists and com-
petetors) subjects (t = 5:54; p < 0:01).9 While unclassied subjects kept less than proself
subjects (t = 1:902; p = 0:067) and prosocial subjects kept less than unclassied subjects
(t = 1:393; p = 0:0880).
9 In this paper, all given p-values are for one tail.
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Additional evidence that SVO su¢ ciently predicts behavior comes from the relationship
between the consistency of the SVO responses and the choice in the dictator game. A measure
equaling 9 indicates perfect consistency in the set of responses and a measure between 6 and
8 indicates a less than perfectly consistent set of responses. See Table 3 for the amount kept
in the dictator game by SVO classication and consistency of measurement
Prosocial Individualistic
Measure=9 4:3125 7:95192
(2:8220) (4:5001)
Measure<9 5:78125 6:11538
(0:27567) (4:4335)
Table 3: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and consistency of
measurement with variance in parentheses
Among those classied as prosocial, those with a measure equal to 9 kept a signicantly
smaller share than those with a measure between 6 and 8 (t = 3:7667; p < 0:01). Also, among
those classied as individualistic, those with a measure equal to 9 kept a signicantly larger
share than those with a measure between 6 and 8 (t = 2:561; p < 0:001). Therefore, we are
reasonably condent in the SVO measure as a predictor of behavior in the dictator game.
As our primary objective is to learn whether the mapping from the measure of SVO to
behavior depends on the order of the measurement, we now compare dictator allocations given
the treatment. First, the di¤erence between the amount kept in the SVO First treatment
(mean=$6:036) and in the SVO Last treatment (mean=$6:160) is not signicant (t = 0:228;
p = 0:4099). However, a signicant relationship emerges when one looks within SVO clas-
sications. See Figure 4 and Table 1 for the amount kept in the dictator game by SVO
classication and treatment.
Prosocial Individualistic
SVO First $4:1429 $7:375
(5:2088) (4:9783)
SVO Last $5:0972 $7:2833
(0:2878) (5:7399)
Table 4 Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and treatment with
variance in parentheses
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Figure 1: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and treatment
Although the individualists in the SVO First treatment do not keep a signicantly di¤erent
amount than the individualists in the SVO Last treatment, there is a signicant di¤erence
within the prosocial subjects. Prosocial subjects in the SVO First treatment keep signicantly
less than the prosocials in the SVO Last treatment (t = 1:5321; p = 0:07390).
This relationship becomes even more signicant when one restricts attention to those with
a consistent SVO measure. Among the prosocials who had an SVO score of 9 in the SVO Last
treatment (Mean=4:885, Variance=0:0897) kept more than the prosocials who had an SVO
score of 9 in the SVO First Treatment (Mean=3:636, Variance=5:455). This relationship is
signicant (t = 1:760; p = 0:0544).
It appears that those with individualistic preferences are not inuenced by their actions
in the measurement of SVO, however those with prosocial preferences are a¤ected by their
choice.
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3 Study 2
3.1 Overview
Roughly speaking, Study 1 nds that subjects with prosocial preferences act even more proso-
cially when the SVO measurement is administered rst whereas those with selsh preferences
are una¤ected by the order of the measurement. Based on the data available from Study1,
it is not clear to us what drives this result. As there is no choice involving the creation of
surplus in the standard dictator game, it is possible that the prosocial subjects in the SVO
First treatment have have primed themselves whereas no priming exists for the prosocials in
the SVO Last treatment. Therefore, if the dictator game was designed in a manner in which
choice decided the amount of surplus then the results in the SVO Last treatment might con-
verge to that of the SVO First treatment. However, it is also possible that with the standard
dictator game, being selsh is too "easy" and so the individualists are not a¤ected by the
timing. Therefore, if the dictator game is designed in a manner in which being selsh is more
costly then we expect a divergence of the results of the SVO First and Last treatments of the
individualists. In Study 2, we hope to to shed some light on the relative merit of these two
explanations.
Study 2 follows the same procedure as Study 1 with the exception that, rather than using
a standard dictator game, we use a dictator game in which the relative allocation "price" is
1 to 3. In other words, the most selsh allocation is $10 to self and $0 to other and the
most generous allocation is $30 to other and $0 to self. This somewhat nonstandard dictator
game has the advantages that 1. the amount of total surplus is a matter of choice and 2.
being selsh is now relatively costly. If we nd that the timing has a reduced inuence on
the prosocials then we favor the former explanation. If we nd that individualists are now
a¤ected by the timing then we will favor the latter explanation.
3.2 Procedure
A total of 90 students from Rutgers University-Camden participated in Study 2. The proce-
dures in Study 2 are identical to that in Study 1 with the exception of the form of the dictator
game. Rather than the standard dictator game in which the trade-o¤ between own payo¤s
and other payo¤s is 1 to 1, the dictator game used in Study 2 has a trade-o¤ of 1 to 3. In
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other words, to increase the amount kept by $0.50, the subjects must reduce the amount sent
to the other subject by $1.50. The subjects own payo¤s were listed in $0.50 increments and
the other subjects payo¤s were listed in $1.50 increments. The subjects were directed to
indicate which of the 21 dictator game allocations they most preferred.
3.3 Results
Again using the procedure of Van Lange et. al. (1997), we categorized 44 subjects (49%)
as prosocial, 34 subjects (38%) as individualists and 4 subjects (4%) as competitors. There
were 8 subjects (9%) who we could not classify as they did not select a minimum of 6 choices
of a particular type. Table 5 summarizes the distribution of subjects according to SVO
categorization and timing of measurement.
Prosocial Individualistic Competitive Uncategorized Total
SVO First 21 16 2 5 44
SVO Last 23 18 2 3 46
Total 44 34 4 8 90
Table 5: Number of subjects by SVO categorization and measurement timing
We nd that the SVO measure predicts behavior across both treatments. See Table 6 for
the amount kept across both treatments.
Prosocial Unclassied Proself
Average Amount Kept in Dictator Game 6:4432 6:0625 8:2763
(7:7583) (14:3884) (5:4283)
Table 6: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication with variance in
parentheses
The prosocial subjects kept signicantly less than did the proself (individualists and com-
petetors) subjects (t = 3:24; p < 0:01). As in Study 1 we nd that the consistency of the
response is related to the choice in the dictator game. See Table 7 to see the amount kept
across both treatments by the consistency of the measurement.
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Prosocial Individualistic
Measure=9 5:9667 8:3824
(9:6540) (5:6103)
Measure<9 7:4643 7:9412
(2:4794) (6:4026)
Table 7: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and consistency of
measurement with variance in parentheses
Similar to Study 1, among those classied as prosocial, subjects with a measure equal to 9
kept a signicantly smaller share than subjects with a measure between 6 and 8 (t = 2:1203;
p = 0:0199). However in contrast to Study 1, among those classied as individualistic,
subjects with a measure equal to 9 did not keep a signicantly di¤erent amount than subjects
with a measure between 6 and 8 (t = 0:5248; p = 0:302).
Finally, we may ask whether the timing matters for dictator game in Study 2. Unlike
Study 1, the di¤erence between the amount kept in the SVO First treatment (mean=$6:705)
and in the SVO Last treatment (mean=$7:641) is signicant (t = 1:570; p = 0:060).
Prosocial Individualistic
SVO First 5:9762 8:0000
(10:1369) (6:4333)
SVO Last 6:8696 8:30556
(5:5504) (5:6806)
Table 8: Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classication and treatment with
variance in parentheses
Although the prosocials in the SVO First treatment keep less than the prosocials in the
SVO Last treatment, this di¤erence is not signicant (t = 1:0499; p = 0:150). However, as
in Study 1, there is no signicant di¤erence in the amount kept by individualists in the SVO
First and SVO Last treatments (t = 0:361; p = 0:360).
The timing remains insignicant among the prosocials even when attention is restricted to
subjects with perfectly consistent SVO measures. The prosocials who had an SVO score of
9 in the SVO Last treatment (Mean=6:4333, Variance=7:7452) kept more than the prosocials
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who had an SVO score of 9 in the SVO First Treatment (Mean=5:5000, Variance=11:7857),
however this relationship is insignicant (t = 0:8179; p = 0:210).
4 Discussion
The main result in Study 1 provided evidence that the measurement of social preferences is
not always done in a nonintrusive manner. We nd that the timing matters for prosocials
but not for individualists. Specically, we nd that prosocial subjects in the SVO First
treatment keep signicantly less in the standard dictator game than prosocials in the SVO
Last treatment. In Study 2 we nd that there is no signicant di¤erence between the SVO
First and SVO Last treatments for either prosocials or individualists. From this we infer that
the results in Study 1 are driven by the presence of choices involving the creation of surplus.
The choice of the size of surplus is present in both stages of Study 2 but only one stage in
Study 1.
5 Concluding Comments
In this paper, we describe two studies in which we measure social preferences through Social
Value Orientation (SVO) and observe the choice in a dictator game. In Study 1 we vary
the order of the SVO measurement and the play of the standard dictator game. There, we
nd evidence that subjects with prosocial preferences act more prosocially when the SVO
measurement is taken rst. On the other hand, our evidence suggests that subjects with
individualistic preferences are not a¤ected by the order of the measurement. These results
imply that measuring social preferences, through techniques such as SVO, might a¤ect the
preferences which they are designed to measure.
An explanation for the main result in Study 1 is not obvious. To gain some insight on the
matter, Study 2 performs the identical procedure as in Study 1 with the exception that the
dictator game exhibits a 1 to 3 trade-o¤ between own payo¤s and other payo¤s (the standard
dictator game has a 1 to 1 trade-o¤). We nd no signicant di¤erence between those making
dictator game decisions before SVO and those making dictator game decisions after SVO,
for prosocials or individualists. Study 2 suggests that the result of Study 1 is driven by
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the presence of decisions regarding the size of the surplus. This e¤ect, which seems to only
inuence the prosocials, are absent in the standard dictator game.
It is worth reecting on the limitations of the present experimental design. For instance,
we cannot determine whether the SVO measurement a¤ects dictator game choices, dictator
game choices a¤ects the SVO measurement or perhaps both. Also, our results suggest that
the preferences of individualists are less malleable than the preferences of prosocials but this
could be a result of our experimental design. For instance, it could be that the optimal choice
of many individualists involves a corner solution at the most selsh allocation. Finally, SVO
only measures social preferences when one receives a larger share than the other subject. The
signicance of this detail is not clear. Hopefully, future work will shed light on these issues.
Some additional questions which deserve future consideration include, does it matter if the
recipient of the dictator game is the same as the recipient of the SVO measure? Would the
performance of unrelated tasks between the measurement of SVO and observation of behavior
change the relationship? What are the implications for the case where standard games like the
ultimatum game or the trust game are substituted for the dictator game? It is also unclear if
the timing matters in the measurement of preferences via GARP or Charness-Rabin, Chen-Li
techniques. Hopefully, future work will address these questions.
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6 Appendix
We asked the following 9 items (from Van Lange et. al. 1997) in order to measure the SVO
of the subjects. Each of the 9 items has a competitive answer, a individualistic answer and
a competitive answer. Each item is stated in terms of points where 1 point corresponded to
$0.0002103.
Question 1 A B C
You: 480 points 540 points 480 points
Other1: 80 points 280 points 480 points
Question 2 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 100 points
Question 3 A B C
You: 520 points 520 points 580 points
Other1: 520 points 120 points 320 points
Question 4 A B C
You: 500 points 560 points 490 points
Other1: 100 points 300 points 490 points
Question 5 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 490 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 90 points
Question 6 A B C
You: 500 points 500 points 570 points
Other1: 500 points 100 points 300 points
Question 7 A B C
You: 510 points 560 points 510 points
Other1: 510 points 300 points 110 points
Question 8 A B C
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You: 550 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 100 points 500 points
Question 9 A B C
You: 480 points 490 points 540 points
Other1: 100 points 490 points 300 points
The individualistic answers are: 1B, 2A, 3C, 4B, 5A, 6C, 7B, 8A and 9C. The prosocial
answers are: 1C, 2B, 3A, 4C, 5B, 6A, 7A, 8C and 9B. The competitive answers are: 1A, 2C,
3B, 4A, 5C, 6B, 7C, 8B and 9A. Van Lange et. al. classies a subject according to the above
labels if six or more items are answered according to the above.
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